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Brezhnev had actually alerted Nixon and Kissinger in advance about the likelihood of war, and fought attempts within the politburo to roll back détente after it started;177 nonetheless, Soviet actions prior to, during, and following the conflict confirmed the suspicions of some Americans, and convinced others, that Moscow could not be trusted. 179 They mounted a campaign to discard détente on the grounds that it had helped the Kremlin leaders to conceal their expansionist and offensive intentions.

During the heyday of détente, in October 1972, American and Soviet negotiators completed a major trade agreement that called for the extension of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to the Soviet Union. The ensuing congressional debate over legislation to implement the agreement, revolving principally around Soviet Jewish emigration policy, resulted in the previously mentioned Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, which barred the extension of MFN status to Communist countries that Israel, Soviet Jewish Emigration, and Idealpolitik 31 restricted the emigration of their citizens.

94 It was only at a meeting with Meir in early December 1971 that Nixon’s shift toward Israel was truly completed. Only then did he raise the Joining the Conservative Brotherhood 19 scale of his administration’s commitment to Israel in all crucial areas. 97 Third, heeding Meir’s complaints about State Department intrusions and probably spurred on by the proven utility of back channels in other policy contexts, Nixon and Meir found means to intensify and institutionalize the practice of communicating through Rabin and Kissinger while keeping the State Department and the Israeli foreign ministry in the dark.