The Ethics Pt 3 - On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotions by Spinoza Baruch
By Spinoza Baruch
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Extra info for The Ethics Pt 3 - On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotions
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Note—This mental modification, or imagination of a particular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called “Wonder;” but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called “Consternation,” because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed in 41 The Ethics – Part III the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no power to think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil. ” Again, if it be the prudence, industry, or what not, of a man we love, that we wonder at, our love will on this account be the greater (III.
Xxii. note. XVI. “Joy” is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue beyond our hope. XVII. “Disappointment” is pain accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope. XVIII. “Pity” is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves (cf. III. xxii. note, and III. xxvii. note). XXI. “Partiality” is thinking too highly of anyone because of the love we bear him. Explanation—Between pity and sympathy (misericordia) there seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former term is used in reference to a particular action, and the latter in reference to a disposition.
Xxvii. For in so far as we conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain, we ourselves feel pain. Note—This proposition can also be proved from the Corollary to II. xvii. D. 37 The Ethics – Part III body is affected in the same manner; wherefore, in so far as the remembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined to regard it with pain; this determination, while the image of the thing in question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance of other things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing, but is not destroyed: hence, a man only feels pleasure in so far as the said determination is checked: for this reason the joy arising from the injury done to what we hate is repeated, every time we remember that object of hatred.